Abstract. In the target article Hutto and Satne propose a new approach to studying mental content.
Introduction
In the target article, Hutto and Satne put forward an interesting proposal on how to change the direction of research on mental content. Very roughly, a state of a system has content if it has some sort of correctness conditions, which may be truth conditions, satisfaction conditions or some kind of accuracy condition (e.g., in the case of contents of singular terms). Mental content, despite being a central explanatory posit in the cognitive sciences and in the philosophy of mind, still lacks a fully satisfactory treatment whereby to establish its proper place in the natural order. The main contenders at providing such a treatment make use of fundamentally different strategies: some try to provide a reductive account of mental content, explaining content as being based on some natural relation; others, nonreductive in nature, attempt to explain mental content by either appealing to ascription and stances or to social practices. All, reductive and nonreductive strategies alike have, Hutto and Satne point out, a host of loose ends, besides being vulnerable to crippling objections either because the reductions do not come through (in the case of the first strategy); or because they seem to fail in that they need to presuppose content so as to even get off the ground (in the case of the nonreductive strategies), and thus do not respect the naturalistic requirement.
The solution, the authors propose, is to change focus and replace the putatively failed attempt at providing a naturalistic reduction of content with an investigation of the natural origins of content. With such an account in hand, we should have all that is needed to explain the place of content in the natural world in a way that is neither mysterious nor antimaterialistic. What is more, this line of research finds a role for all three strategies mentioned above, thereby urging those that have been opponents up to now to join forces and contribute each a part of the whole account. I will follow Hutto and Satne (and Haugeland 1990) in calling the three strategies neo Cartesianism (reductionist), neobehaviourism (based on content ascriptions) and neo pragmatism (based on social practices), though these labels should not be taken too seriously, as the authors themselves admit, and are moreover meant to cover only the main positions in the field 1 . I shall not here be directly concerned with their diagnosis of the failures of those three strategies in clarifying the notion of mental content, and of why they cannot work, as things stand. Rather, I shall focus on their positive proposal for a new framework in which to couch research on content.
The central piece of the general diagnosis, though, works also as the basic assumption on which Hutto and Satne ground the framework they propose. The "offending assumption", as they call it, is to equate intentionality with having semantic content. This assumption is said to be behind the failures of the three traditional strategies, and it is the rejection of this assumption that allows the authors' alternative proposal to take off In what follows, I will examine this central assumption and, in particular, how to 1 One position that has been gaining ground in recent years and which is not included among the main contenders is the 'phenomenal intentionality' view (see e.g. Horgan and Tienson 2002) . 2 Although only partially so. See below. make sense of its rejection that Hutto and Satne advocate. Firstly, I believe, it is important to get clear on what we are talking about when we talk of intentionality, for things do not seem as transparent as we would like them to be in this domain. Hence, I will try to extract from the target article the notion of intentionality (mainly) at play in its arguments. I will then argue that the notion of content at work in the view proposed by Hutto and Satne is too tightly linked to the semantic properties of beliefs and desires, and that it is such a narrow notion that leads them to severely limit the contributions that the neoCartesian approach can offer to the naturalising content project. Indeed, neglecting an alternative, broader, notion of content puts, given its importance in the cognitive sciences, undesirable limits on the scope of the endeavour of explaining content naturalistically.
Moreover, as I will try to show, the proposed distinction between Urintentionality and intentionality is not finegrained enough to cover the whole ground, as we need a middle ground notion of contentful state that falls short of beliefs and desires. Once again, I will claim that, as a consequence, the neoCartesian can do more than only explain the natural origins of Urintentionality: it can help explain the natural origins of nonconceptual as well as of some conceptual contentful states.
These considerations, though, take their force from an acceptance of mainstream, representational cognitive science. If we should reject the representationalist view, as Hutto elsewhere advocates (Hutto and Myin 2013a) , and embrace the Radical Enactivism therein proposed, the worries I present below lose their force. This suggests that the framework proposed by Hutto and Satne requires not only that the "offending assumption" be rejected, but also that Radical Enactivism be embraced. The success of their proposal thereby turns on the fate of the radical non representationalist position that it naturally accompanies.
With these anticipations on board, let us first tackle the distinction between different types of content mentioned above and see how it bears on the picture offered by the target article.
2 Intentionality, Representation, and Content
In the philosophy of mind content can be understood in at least two different ways, even though these two different meanings tend to be equated or confused quite often.
These two ways may be more or less related, depending on the overall theory of cognition in which they are embedded. The distinction to which I refer here is that between what we may call intentional content and representational content. The former notion is an element of theories of intentionality, while the latter is an element of theories of representation. I suggest that we follow those philosophers (Cummins 1996; Ramsey 2007; Colombo 2014 ) who stress the importance of keeping these two kinds of theory separated against the somewhat widespread trend of running them
together. But what does the distinction actually consist in? Here is Colombo (2014, n. 
6):
More accurately, the problem of intentionality asks how mental items such as thoughts, beliefs, and desires can be directed towards, or be about, other specific items. The problem of representation asks how certain kinds of items, viz. representations, can represent, can be directed towards, or be about, other items. The concepts of intentionality and representation are distinct, and in fact the notion of representation can be used as a means to address the problem of intentionality. Yet, the problem of representation and the problem of intentionality are often taken to be identical. , and further on he claims that "even now, accounts of representation ('intentionality') swing from approaches that insist that representation is the special achievement of reflective human beings or language users to approaches that maintain that representation is as common as causally based 3 Similarly, Ramsey (2007) , p. 18: "there seems to be a tacit assumption held by many philosophers that a theory of intentionality just is a theory of representation". 4 Burge (2010) For instance, neopragmatist accounts seem to be working with this narrower notion of intentionality as their explanandum. Indeed, their view is that content is to be understood in terms of social practices: it is only by being part of these practices that intentional states become contentful. Such practices may consist, for example, in conforming to the ways of living of a society (Haugeland 1990) , or in reasongiving to 5 Burge (2010 ), p. 432. 6 Cummins (1996 , p. 16. justify actions (Cash 2009 ).
If the foregoing considerations are on the right track, we should expect neo pragmatists to contribute very little to clarify the notion of content at work in most cognitive science, which is not intentional in the narrow sense, but representational nonetheless. For most of psychology and cognitive neuroscience are concerned with a type of content that lies at the subpersonal level and does not involve fullfledged intentional states such as beliefs and desires. Most of cognitive science has as its objective that of explaining cognitive processes involved in abilities such as linguistic processing, face recognition, visual perception, and so on. Cash (2009) , in which this attempt is made but, I believe, in a way that does not do away with eliminativist worries. An ascriptionist strategy is hypothesised also by Fenici (2013) . Of course, if one embraces non-representationalism about those cognitive mechanisms, this may not seem to be a problem. Nevertheless, non-representationalists must provide accounts of how complex cognitive accounts of these kinds of representational contents should be provided by the neo pragmatist in the future, it is mysterious how such accounts could be provided for animals not involved in social practices. Hence, even if we, for the sake of argument, concede much space to the neopragmatist strategy, we will still leave out a considerable range of cognitive phenomena that call for explanation in representational terms: those involving asocial animals. My point here is not to demarcate precise boundaries, so it suffices to me to point out that the neopragmatist strategy leaves out at least some cognitive phenomena that are contentful and which, though not intentional in the restricted sense, are nonetheless representational.
These considerations do not of course threaten the neopragmatist account of intentional content, but only of representational content in general, as we are understanding these terms herein.
Hutto and Satne might be working with this more restricted notion of intentionality in mind 8 . And this not only because of the space they give to the treatment of the neopragmatist strategy, which focuses on beliefs and desires and reasongiving for actions, but also due to the formulation of the main question behind the philosophical enterprise of naturalising content that they accept. As a description of that enterprise, they quote Rosenberg (2013, p. 3), who claims that "the basic problem that intentionality raises for naturalism ... [is] how can a clump of matter, for example, the brain or some proper part of it, have propositional content 9 , be about some other thing in the universe". Unless we take this claim to be referring to the narrower notion of intentionality mentioned above, the claim is too strong 10 . For there is no need that representational content be propositional. In most cases, on the contrary, it will be nonconceptual and nonpropositional
11
. It is, for instance, hard to abilities can be explained with no recourse to representations. See the section 'Concluding Remarks' below. 8 Though they probably are not, and would rather endorse non-representationalism, thus doing away with what I have been calling here representational content. See below. 9 Emphasis added. 10 Alternatively, if the project of naturalising intentionality is thus formulated and taken to cover all forms of intentionality, it opens itself to the charge of overintellectualism (Hutto and Myin, 2013a, chap. 5) . 11 Burge (2010, pp. 36, 104) , for instance, argues that perceptual content is not propositional even though we explain it propositionally. see without considerable stretch how a spatial map in rat hippocampus can be said to have propositional content 12 . However, it can be said, on most accounts of representation at least, that it represents the spatial layout of a certain region.
What I would like here to put forward is that the neoCartesian attempts at reducing content, if targeted at representational content and not at the contents of beliefs and desires, contra Fodor (1975) . Of course, whether anything on these lines can eventually work, thus vindicating, at least partly, neoCartesians in their attempts to reduce content, is to be seen. At any rate, given that the stringent requirements on a theory of intentional content may not apply, the endeavour does not seem hopeless.
NeoCartesianism seems appropriate at least for representational content that 12 See Rescorla (2009). 13 As in Cummins (1996) . 14 See Ramsey (2007) . falls short of the contents of fullfledged beliefs and desires. Here, I think, there opens a problem for the framework offered by Hutto and Satne. For, on their picture, there appears to be no space for this type of content. Indeed, either we make the neo pragmatists offer an account of representational content thus understood, which I take cannot be easily provided given the commitments of that position 3 Urintentionality, the origins of content and neoCartesianism The notion of Urintentionality plays an important role in the framework outlined by Hutto and Satne. The idea is that we ought to distinguish "primitive, contentless from contentbased forms of intentionality". Urintentionality would thus be some sort 15 And neither can the ascriptionism of neo-behaviourists, at least if we want to keep to a realist understanding of representation. 16 That is the line followed by Hutto and Myin (2013a) . 17 Even though some talk of representation in the cognitive sciences may be misleading, as Ramsey (2007) argues at length. But see Shagrir (2012) for a reply that considerably downsizes Ramsey's point. Burge (2010, chap. 8) also argues against what he calls "deflationary" theories of representation, while Hutto and Myin (2013a, pp. 120ff .) adopt a thoroughly non-representational view and contend that the cognitive sciences do not need to posit representations in most cases. See below.
of directedness, or targeting 18 , that is not in itself contentful, and thus neither representational nor intentional in the foregoing sense. Urintentionality, as such, is to be found rather widely in the phylogenetic tree, being a feature of any system that sports sensitivity to certain states of the world. According to Hutto and Satne, it is on this level that neoCartesians, in their teleological flavour, should focus. That is to say, neoCartesians should, by means of the theory of natural selection, explain how mechanisms for responding to specific features of the environment, such as sensory and motor systems, have evolved. Importantly, these systems do not as yet involve representational content or intentional content. which proves even more necessary given the lack of agreement on how to employ talk of representation in the cognitive sciences and the risk that some explanations couched in representational terms may need no appeal to representations to be successful. It is thus at least doubtful, I believe, that representation should be regarded as a scientific primitive, as Burge (2010, p. 298) holds. Moreover, as Hutto and Myin (2013a, pp. 116 7) point out, taking representation to be a primitive does nothing to dispel the conceptual and empirical problems that the notion involves.
In any case, I believe that the distinction between contentful and noncontentful states by Hutto and Satne, Burge and Ramsey, though drawn in different ways by the different authors, is a precious one. It keeps us from the temptation of explaining in representational terms that which should be explained with no such terms 21 .
21 And if I understand the authors correctly, determining the boundaries of this distinction should be the privilege of neo-behaviourists. It is not clear to me, though, that the proposed distinction between intentional agents and intentional patients succeeds in advancing matters. In particular, it seems to me that intentional patients, such as animals and infants, end up having contentful states in Moreover, as Hutto and Satne rightly point out, the explanatory task does not stop with accounting for how sensorimotor mechanisms respond appropriately to environmental stimuli. The shift of perspective they propose, from trying to reduce content to trying to explain its natural origins, is, I think, a very welcome one. Though as I argued in the previous section I do not think that we should abandon the project of naturalising content, I believe that the question about the natural origins is a interesting one with which theorists should engage. In some cases at least, such as the ones in which only Urintentionality is involved, the question about the natural origins of the relevant sensitiveness should be the only one of real interest.
However, I want to advance that, in a way analogous to the considerations in the previous section, the distinction between intentionality and Urintentionality that
Hutto and Satne draw is not finegrained enough. For recall that they rely mainly on the neopragmatist strategy in order to account for contentinvolving intentionality. By doing so, they must commit themselves to the implausible view that nonhuman animals, or at least asocial nonhuman animals, as well as humans socially isolated from birth and infants, do not feature contentful states, but only forms of Ur intentionality. While I agree that it is possible that they may not feature intentional content in the sense of entertaining beliefs and desires, the notion of Urintentionality fails to capture the representational abilities of such living beings. One of the most important shortcomings of the neopragmatist strategy is still to be found in the framework proposed by Hutto and Satne. In other words, there is a lot in the 'content spectrum' between the noncontentful "response tendencies" typical of Ur intentionality, and beliefs and desires possibly grounded on social practices typical of intentionality (narrowly understood).
Perceptual states, for instance, are plausible candidates for contentful mental states which are not dependent on social practices for their contents and that thus should inhabit the middle ground
22
. There is every reason to believe that many 'merely' ascriptionist fashion (see Shea 2013, pp. 498-9) . 22 Hutto and Myin (2013a, chap. 6 ) defend the view that perception is non-representational. How perceptual abilities, as well as the aspectual nature of perception, could be accounted for without having recourse to representation is though not clear. See Matthen (2014) .
animals as well as isolated humans entertain perceptual states. While these states and their contents cannot be explained by means of social practices, given that there are none involved in these cases, they cannot be treated as cases of Urintentionality, for they are (plausibly) contentful. Yet, the natural origins of these kinds of contentful states can be explained by natural selection as much as the noncontentinvolving states typical of Urintentionality.
There is an evolutionary story about how perceptual systems came to be formed and how they exploited constancies in sensory input to produce representations of informing fullfledged beliefs and desires.
As another example, take work in developmental psychology. An influential theory in that field of studies, dubbed "Core Cognition", claims that humans come equipped with innate (nonlearned) representations and representational abilities which form the core cognition systems
25
. Core cognition systems are generally believed to be dedicated at least to forming conceptual representations of objects, numerosity, and agency. These innate representations cannot clearly be explained by social practices, being innate and present in infants as well as nonverbal animals, but looking for an evolutionary story about how these core cognition modules and basic representations came to be incorporated into the innate tools of animal and human cognitive systems is a quest worth pursuing. Indeed, according to Carey (2009) , long evolutionary history is one of the marks of core cognition.
Note, furthermore, that the core cognition thesis, if correct, puts further strain on the division of labour between the three strategies proposed by Hutto and Satne. For here we are not speaking any longer of perceptual representations or cognitive maps that are arguably neither conceptual nor propositional, but, rather, we would be tackling representations with conceptual content, both in humans and nonverbal animals. And it is mysterious how neopragmatism, the strategy responsible for explaining the actually contentful states in the picture offered by the target article, can provide an account of how these states come to be contentful at all that does not risk to be merely ascriptionist, making content exist only in the eye of the beholder.
For here, prima facie, no social practices are involved, no reasongiving for actions, no pressures for conformism. Nonetheless, keeping in place the caveat that there is no certainty about how correct the core cognition thesis actually is (though a rather impressive amount of evidence in its favour has been amassed 26 ), core cognition representations seem to be contentful in a way not dissimilar to the way beliefs and desires are contentful: they both are conceptual representations.
Once again, these considerations do not directly undermine the picture according 25 See, for instance, Carey (2009 What I want here to suggest is that, in the light of these efforts, the framework proposed by Hutto and Satne should be somewhat modified. The notions of intentionality and Urintentionality seem to be insufficient to cover the whole ground. In a recent book, Hutto and Myin (2013a) propose that we should reject the idea that much of cognition depends on contentful states. These authors advocate what they call Radical Enactivism, according to which "our most elementary ways of engaging with the world and others -including our basic forms of perception and perceptual experience -are mindful in the sense of being phenomenally charged and intentionally directed, despite being nonrepresentational and contentfree"
27
. This approach sets forth the idea that contentful states come to be only when "associated with linguistic symbols and forms of cognition that feature in and are logically and developmentally dependent upon shared, scaffolded practices"
28
.
If we accept this picture, the points I raised above vanish. If much of cognition, including perception, is nonrepresentational, then there is no need, as I urged above, to complement the framework proposed by Hutto and Satne by adding a middle ground between beliefs and desires, and Urintentionality. However, that means that for that framework to work we must not only reject the "offending assumption" that all intentionality involves content. In addition, we must also buy into the much stronger assumption according to which most of mentality is contentless. This is, I take, the only way to do away with the gap in the proposed strategy for the Intentionality Team that I have stressed above. In a few words, if what Hutto and Satne propose as the best path to explaining the place of intentionality in the natural order is to be left unchanged, accepting it requires accepting the radical, and as of now, not sufficiently detailed picture of Hutto and Myin (2013a) . That is to say, the strategy they propose for the team, if not complemented in the ways suggested above, requires that the whole team endorse Radical Enactivism. Whether the Intentionality Team would have anything to gain from defending the colours of Radical Enactivism is, though, yet to be shown.
